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Abstract: 
 
 
This paper tests the impact of the Costa Rican minimum wage policy on wage inequality and the 
level of employment in the formal sector (covered by minimum wage legislation) and the 
informal (uncovered) sector. We also examine the redistributive effects of the minimum wage, 
between the covered sector and the uncovered sector. Regression analysis using micro data from 
the Labour Force Surveys over 17 years reveals three important findings. At the median, a unit 
increase in the minimum wage relative to the average wage is associated with:  
 
a)  a reduction in wage inequality in the covered sector of between 0.9 percent (using the 
Gini) and 1.7 percent (using the Theil mean logarithmic deviation) and there is no 
effect on earnings inequality among the self-employed (using all measures);  
b)  an increase in the level of covered sector employment by 0.56 percent, but no effect 
on the number of self-employed over time;  
c)  an increase in the average number of hours worked per week by 0.14 percent in the 
covered sector and 0.34 percent in the uncovered sector. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, these finds are counter to the traditional competitive two-sector 
models of the minimum wage.  We interpret them as supporting the monopsonistic and 
efficiency wage models of the labour market in those industries where the ratio of the minimum 
wage to the average wage (“toughness”) is low but supports the traditional models in those 
industries where toughness is high. Given that we found overall employment to have increased, 
minimum wages could be seen as assisting the reallocation of labour from the traditional to the 
more modern sectors. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: minimum wages, employment, wage inequality, monopsony, Costa RicaWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
 
 
  1
1. INTRODUCTION 
Minimum wage policies have always been controversial among economists and policy 
makers and the debate has become more heated following the recent publication of the book by 
Card and Krueger (1995) and related papers (e.g., Katz and Krueger, 1992; Card and Krueger, 
1994). Supporters of minimum wages justify them as a way of improving the living conditions of 
the poor, unskilled, unorganised workers. Critics emphasize the efficiency losses associated with 
their use, and disqualify them as an adequate way of affecting inequality. They argue that in 
developing countries minimum wages are the principal source of labour market segmentation 
and unemployment.  
The traditional view, using the standard two-sector model which assumes a perfectly 
competitive labour market with homogeneous and mobile labour, is that an increase in the 
minimum wage, reduces employment in the covered sector, creates unemployment, and has 
“negative” spillover effects in the uncovered sector (i.e., increasing employment there and 
putting downward pressure on wages at the lower end of the distribution).
1  Hence increasing the 
minimum wage should increase income inequality in the uncovered sector and reduce it in the 
covered sector.  
On the other hand if minimum wages do not reduce employment in the covered sector 
and hence have no spillover effects (the outcome in a monopsonistic model of the labour 
market), changes in minimum wages will not have an efficiency loss and may not effect wage 
inequality in the uncovered sector.
2  If employment actually increases in the covered sector as a 
result of minimum wage increase, and draws low wage workers from the uncovered sector, then 
one might expect earnings inequality to fall in the uncovered sector. Until the Card and Krueger 
(1994, 1995) and related research, which found a positive effect of the minimum wage on William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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employment in the US, monopsony was not a very popular model of the labour market. Dickens 
et al. (1999, p.2) argue that monopsony may be more common than we have traditionally 
believed from the one-company town examples: “For example, in most labour markets 
employers that cut wages do not instantaneously lose all their workers, so the supply of labour to 
a firm is not perfectly elastic, and firms therefore posses some monopsony power… in the short 
and long run.” 
Our paper examines the effects of changes in the minimum wage on earnings inequality 
and aggregate level of employment in Costa Rica’s covered and uncovered sectors over the 
1980-92 period. We also examine whether changes in the minimum wage lead to a reallocation 
of labour between the covered and uncovered sector.  
There are a number of features about Costa Rica that make it an interesting country for 
the analysis of minimum wages and inequality in the two sectors.  For one there is a significant 
group, approximately one-fifth of the employed, who are not covered by minimum wages. These 
are self-employed (“informal sector”) workers.
3  Second, unlike most countries, Costa Rica has 
multiple minimum wages, set for various occupations and industries.  In the 1970s and early 
1980s there were approximately 350 minimum wages and in 1990 the number was reduced to 
about 80.  Setting the minimum at different levels by occupation and industry could but need not 
be more a more effective instrument for raising the wage floor and reducing wage inequality than 
one minimum wage.  However, the Costa Rican National Salary Council has taken an additional 
step of systematically raising the lowest minimum wages by a greater percentage than it raised 
the higher minimum wages over the 1980’s and 1990’s. Moreover, the Council did not allow 
minimum wages to erode over the 1980s as was the case in most Latin American countries 
(especially Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru). As seen in Figure 1, the plot of the lowest minimum William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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wage in each industry as a percent of the average wage of covered sector workers in each 
industry over the 1976-1992 period reveals that minimum wages have been fairly stable and 
relatively high (the median is 55% of the average wage) when compared to other countries. 
Hence, one would expect from the manner in which minimum wages are designed and changed 
over time, that minimum wages would reduce inequality among Costa Rican workers in the 
covered sector. Their impact on the uncovered sector depends on whether the labour market is 
competitive or monopsonistic. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Inequality 
There are many ways to measure wage inequality; we have used three widely accepted 
measures. First, the coefficient of variation, 
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where Yi is the earnings/wage of person i in the population, n represents the number of people in 
the population, and Y  is the mean wage in the population.  
The second indicator we use is the most common measure of wage inequality, namely the 
Gini coefficient: 
  G= 1+ 1/n - 2/n
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where n and Y  as before, and Y1, 2Y2, ...nYn. is the individual income in decreasing order of size.  
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  The measures differ in their sensitivity to income variations at different levels of the 
distribution.  For equi-distant transfers, the Gini index is considered to be more sensitive to 
changes around the mode, while the coefficient of variation is more sensitive to transfers at the 
top of the distribution.  The mean logarithmic deviation is relatively more responsive to changes 
at the lower end of the distribution.  
To test whether the level of the minimum wage and changes in the minimum wage affect 
wage dispersion in the covered and the uncovered sectors, we estimate the following equation 
separately for the covered and uncovered sectors: 
 lnDit = αο + α1 (MWi/Wi)t +  ∑
=
6
1 i
βi Ii + ∑
=
12
1 t
γt Tt + µ         (4) 
where the subscripts i = 1…7 are for each industry,
5 and t =1...13 for years (1980–1992) and: 
•  D= CV,G,T  is a measure of hourly wage dispersion within an industry and sector in each of 
the 13 years. 
•  ΜW/W is the lowest average hourly minimum wage set by the government for each industry 
divided by the average hourly wage in each industry.  This variable captures the “toughness” 
of the minimum wage. 
•  I are industry specific dummies, with domestics as the base. 
•  T are annual dummies for 1980-1992.  
  Industry and time dummies are added to control for industry and time fixed effects, such 
as changes in aggregate output and shocks over time.  We also test whether the impact of the 
minimum wage is non-linear (with a quadratic specification) and whether the minimum wage has 
a lagged effect, using a one-year lag.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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2.2 Employment Effects 
  To estimate the employment affect of the minimum wage we estimate separate 
regressions for the covered and uncovered sector workers using two different measures as a 
dependent variable: a) the log of the number employed (by industry and year) and b) the total 
number of hours worked in an average week (by industry and year).  These measures allow us to 
learn about the reallocation of workers and hours worked across industries over time.  We also 
examine whether there is a reallocation of labour within an industry between covered and 
uncovered employment as the “toughness” of minimum wages rises.  For this we use the percent 
working in the covered sector in each industry (and year) as a dependent variable. All three of 
these measures are regressed on various specifications of the “toughness” measure with industry 
and time fixed effects. 
2.3 Data 
  The analysis is based on aggregated data from the Costa Rican annual Household Survey 
of Employment and Unemployment (HSEU).  The minimum wage data were taken from the 
Gazetta published by the Ministry of Labor.  Since it was not possible to match the occupational 
codes in the HSEU with those in the Gazetta, we have selected the lowest minimum wage in 
each one-digit industrial sector as our benchmark. The toughness measure used in our analysis is 
plotted in Figure 1.  In the regression analysis we were not able to use the data from the 1976-
1979 household surveys because no questions were asked to distinguish self-employment from 
other forms of employment in 1977-79. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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3. FINDINGS 
3.1 Trend of the Wage Inequality (1976–1992) 
In Figure 2 we present plots of the three measures of inequality in the hourly labour 
earnings of all workers.  In Figure 3 we plot these measures for the covered and uncovered 
workers.  The plots reveal the following patterns:  
a)  Earnings inequality for the whole population fell over the 1982–1992 period.  This is 
the case for all three measures of inequality but the decline is most dramatic in the 
coefficient of variation.  (Inequality was very high in 1981-1982 when there was very 
high inflation.) 
b)  The hourly earnings of covered workers are distributed more equally than those of 
the uncovered sector in every year. 
c)  The level of earnings inequality fell by a greater percentage in the covered sector than 
in the uncovered sector. 
An examination of the Gini for the covered and uncovered/self-employed workers in each 
of the seven industries (Figures 4 and 5, respectively) indicate the same overall declining pattern, 
but a more erratic pattern among the industries in 1981 and 1982, when inflation was high.  It is 
also noteworthy that the relative level of inequality among the industries is not consistent across 
the covered and uncovered sectors. 
3.2 Inequality Results 
The results from estimating equation (4) with the three measures of wage dispersion are 
presented in Table 1.  Panel A contains the coefficients from the regression using the coefficient 
of variation as the dependent variable, Panel B contains the findings using the Gini and Panel C 
presents the results for the Theil mean log deviation measure.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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The main finding is striking: up to a point an increase in the industry specific minimum 
wage relative to industry average wages, reduces wage inequality in the covered sector when 
inequality is measured with the Gini and the Theil mean log deviation.  However, it has no effect 
on the covered sector when measured with the coefficient of variation. The toughness measure 
has no impact on the earnings inequality of the self-employed in all three regressions.  The effect 
on the covered sector is non-linear and it is decreasing at a decreasing rate.
6  As seen in Table 2, 
at the lowest level of toughness we find in the data (30 percent), a one percentage point increase in 
the toughness measure reduces inequality by 2 to 3 percent, depending on which measure is used. A 
unit increase at the median level of toughness (55.5 percent) reduces inequality between 0.9 and 1.7 
percent but at the highest level of toughness (89 percent) a one-percentage point increase actually 
increases inequality (but only by 0.4 to 0.6 percent).  Hence as long as the minimum wage is not set 
“too high,” it reduces inequality.
7  One explanation offered for this is that enforcement is even less 
stringent when the minimum is very high. 
3.3 Employment  
  Contrary to the traditional view, we find that up to a point minimum wage increases are 
associated with increases in the level of total and covered sector employment (see Table 3).  We 
find no statistically significant correlation between the toughness of the minimum wage and the 
number of self-employed. The relationship between the minimum wage toughness measure and the 
level of employment is non-linear (for both total and covered sector): an increase in the toughness of 
the minimum wage increases employment at a decreasing rate.
8  As seen in Table 4, total 
employment rises by 1.1 percent and covered sector employment rises by 1.3 percent when the 
toughness measure rises from 30 to 31 percent.  The employment effect is positive until the 
toughness measure reaches between 68 and 75 percent (for total employment and covered sector William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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employment, respectively).  At that point further increases in the minimum wage reduce 
employment.  At the highest level of toughness observed in Costa Rica over this period, a one 
percentage point increase lowers total employment by 0.6 percent and covered sector employment 
by 0.4 percent. 
These findings may be interpreted as supporting the monopsonistic model, which predicts that 
increases in wages can increase employment up to the point where the marginal cost is equal to the 
marginal revenue.  Any increases above that point force the employer to be on his/her demand 
curve.  However, it is difficult to imagine a labour market for unskilled workers as functioning as in 
the monopsonistic model.  Hence, another plausible interpretation of these findings is that they 
support the traditional model of the labour market for less skilled workers and the monopsonistic or 
efficiency wage models for the skilled workers. In particular, industries that use unskilled labour 
and pay low wages have a high ratio of minimum to actual wage (i.e., high toughness). Firms in 
these industries face an elastic supply of labour and when a rise in minimum wage forces these 
firms to move up their demand for labour curves and lay off workers. This is consistent with the 
negative employment effect documented in Tables 3 and 4. On the other hand, industries that 
employ relatively more skilled labour (and where capital intensity may be higher), have a low ratio 
of the minimum to the average wage (i.e., low toughness). These are also the industries that are 
likely to face upward sloping supply curve of labour or where employers may pay efficiency wages 
so as to attract and keep skilled workers. In these industries an increase in the minimum wage may 
be expected to raise employment under the monopsonistic or efficiency wage scenario. This is 
consistent with the positive effect of increasing minimum wage on employment found for these 
industries in Tables 3 and 4.
9  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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Our empirical estimates are hence consistent with the view that the minimum wage increases 
assist in reallocating labour from the “traditional” to the “modern” sector in the spirit of the Lewis 
model. The high wage (modern sector) firms would not raise wages and employment unless 
induced to do so by the minimum wage increase. The low wage (traditional sector) firms in turn 
release labour that migrates to the expanding high wage (modern) sector. The story is appealing but 
needs fine tuning in terms of explaining skill compatibility between the two sectors. 
Turning to our findings on the impact of minimum wages on the number of hours worked in an 
average week, we find that up to a point, increases in the minimum wage are positively correlated 
with the toughness of the minimum wage in both the covered and uncovered sector (Table 5). 
Moreover, the impact is much greater (and more highly significant) among the self-employed 
workers.  Whereas at the lowest toughness level a one percentage point increase in toughness 
increases number of hours worked by covered sector workers by 0.4 percent, it increases the 
number of hours worked in self-employment by 1.2 percent see Table 6).  Hence, although the 
number of self-employed workers do not change with changes in the minimum wage relative to 
average wage, the number of hours of the self-employed do change. As with the impact on 
employment, once the minimum wage toughness reaches 66 to71 percent of the average wage in the 
industry, the number of hours worked in the covered sectors begins to fall and at the highest level it 
falls by 0.2 percent in the covered sector and 0.8 percent among the self employed.  Tests for longer 
term effects show that the estimated coefficients on one year lagged toughness variable are not 
significant when entered in addition to the current measure of toughness. 
3.4 Reallocation of workers between the covered and uncovered sector, within an industry 
Our analysis of the allocation of workers between the covered and uncovered sectors within 
an industry indicates that as minimum wages rise relative to average wages in an industry, the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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percentage of workers in the covered sector will rise (see Table 7).  The short-run impact is 
marginally statistically significant (with P value of 0.113) and indicates a linear effect of 0.19 
percent increase in the percentage of covered sector workers.  This of course relates to the findings 
in Table 1, where increases in the toughness of the minimum wage increases the number of covered 
sector workers (up to a point) but seems to leave the number of self employed unchanged.   
However, we also have the interesting finding that the coefficient on the lagged value of toughness 
is significant (at the five percent level) and indicates that a one percentage point increase in 
toughness in one year will raise the percent of workers in the covered sector by 0.29 percent in the 
following year.  Hence the redistribution of labour from the informal to the formal sector within 
each industry, brought about by increases in the minimum wage, is significant and long term.  This 
is counter to the traditional view that increases in the minimum wage enlarge the informal sector. 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to test whether the Costa Rican government is reaching its 
goal of reducing wage inequality while at the same time not reducing significantly the level of 
employment in the covered sector with the use of a complicated minimum wage policy.  We also 
examine the redistributive effects of the minimum wage between the covered and the uncovered 
(self-employed) sectors.  
Costa Rica has a complex system of minimum wages that are industry and occupation 
specific.  Over the 1980s and 1990s, the government has been systematically raising the lowest 
minimum wages by a higher percentage than the higher minimum wages. We show that 
minimum wages in Costa Rica have been maintained at relatively high levels with respect 
average wages (the median is 55.5 percent) over this period.  Moreover, unlike most of the Latin William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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America countries, this ratio has risen in the 1980s compared to the 1970s.  We find a declining 
trend in overall inequality (using three measures) over the 1980–1992 period.  We also find that 
the level of wage (earnings) inequality among covered sector workers is lower than among the 
uncovered sector workers. Finally, inequality has declined more rapidly in the covered sector 
than that in the uncovered sector. 
Regression analysis reveals that at the median, a unit increase in the minimum wage 
relative to the average wage in the industry is associated with: a) a reduction in wage inequality 
in the covered sector of between 0.9 percent (using the Gini) and 1.7 percent (using the Theil 
mean logarithmic deviation) and no effect on earnings inequality among the self-employed 
(using all measures); b) an increase in the level of covered sector employment by 0.56 percent 
and total employment by 0.35 percent, but has no effect on the number of self-employed; c) an 
increase in the average number of hours worked per week by 0.14 percent in the covered sector 
and 0.34 percent in the uncovered sector; and d) a raise in the percentage of covered sector 
workers within an industry by 0.29 percent one year after the minimum wage is increased.   
Hence, the Costa Rican government does appear to be accomplishing its goal and its policy also 
seems to be assisting the reallocation of workers from the self-employed (informal) sector to the 
covered (formal) sectors counter to the traditional view.  
From a theoretical perspective, these finds are counter to the traditional competitive two-
sector models of the minimum wage.  We interpret these findings as supporting the 
monopsonistic and efficiency wage models of the labour market in those industries where the 
ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage (“toughness”) is low but supports the traditional 
models in those industries where toughness is high.  Hence, workers in traditional industries 
(with low average wages) are losing jobs whereas workers in more modern industries (with high William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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average wages) are gaining jobs.  Given that we found overall employment to have increased, 
minimum wages could be seen as assisting the reallocation of labour from the traditional to the 
more modern sectors. 
Notes  
1See for e.g., Brown (1999) for a description of this model. 
2See for e.g., Card and Krueger (1995) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995). 
3In this paper we use the terms ‘informal sector’ and ‘self-employed’ interchangeably. 
4For further definitions see Coulter et al. (1992). 
5The seven industrial sectors are: agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transportation, 
commerce and finance, services and domestics.  Domestic servants were singled out since they 
are a large group (about 10%) of the work force. 
6Tests for other specifications of the equation indicated that neither the coefficients for the linear 
toughness specification nor those for the lagged toughness specification were not significantly 
different from zero for either sector. 
7The turning point is when minimum wages were about 79-81 percent of the average wage in the 
industry. 
8The coefficient on toughness was not significant either in the linear specification or the lagged 
specification (when the lagged term was entered in addition to the current term). 
9Note that in the monopsonistic model a rise in the minimum wage results in an increase in 
employment as the firm moves rightward along the supply curve of labour.  The positive effect 
will of course be reversed when one reaches the point of intersection of labour supply and 
demand and further wage increases will result in a backward movement along the employer’s 
demand curve. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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Table 1: 
 
Effect of Minimum Wage on Wage Dispersion   
 
   
 
  Covered  
Sector 
  Self-
Employed 
 
 
   
 
Panel A: log of coefficient 
of variation 
   
 
Toughness -0.015
  -0.0039 
 
 (0.015)
  (0.0158) 
 
Toughness
2  0.00008
  0.00005 
 
 (0.00010)
  (0.00011) 
 
Time Dummies  Yes
  Yes 
 
Industry dummies  Yes
  Yes 
 
Adjusted R
2  0.80
  0.77 
 
Panel B: log of Gini   
   
 
Toughness -0.0315
a -0.015 
 
 (0.013)
  (0.013) 
 
Toughness
2  0.0002
b 0.0001 
 
 (0.0001)
  (0.0001) 
 
Time Dummies  Yes
  Yes 
 
Industry dummies  Yes
  Yes 
 
Adjusted R
2  0.73
  0.79 
 
Panel C:  Theil mean log 
deviation 
   
 
Toughness -0.055
b -0.034 
 
 (0.025)
  (0.031) 
 
Toughness
2  0.00034
c 0.00029 
 
 (0.00018)
  (0.00022) 
 
Time Dummies  Yes
  Yes 
 
Industry Dummies  Yes
  Yes 
 
Adjusted R
2  0.69
  0.60 
 
No. of Observations  91
  91 
 
   
 
aSignificant at the 1% level; 
bsignificant at the 5% 
level; 
csignificant at the 10% level. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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Table 2: 
Impact of Changes in the Toughness of 
the Minimum Wage on Inequaltiy 
Range of Toughness Measure 
Lowest Median Highest 
Increase  in (30.0) (55.5) (89.0) 
Gini -0.0195 -0.0093 0.0041
Theil -0.0346 -0.0173 0.00552
 
 
 
Table 3: 
Impact of Minimum wages on the Log of Employment 
    
  Total 
employment
Covered Sector 
Employment 
Self-
Employment 
 
    
Toughness 0.019
c  0.0211
c  0.016 
 
 (0.011) (0.0118) (0.19) 
 
(Toughness)
2  -0.00014
c  -0.00014
c  -0.00018 
 
 (0.00007) (0.00009)
  (0.00014) 
 
Time Dummies  yes yes
  yes  
Industry Dummies  yes yes  yes   
 
    
Adjusted R
2  0.97 0.97 0.97  
No. of Observations  91 91 91  
    
aSignificant at the 1% level; 
bsignificant at the 5% level; 
csignificant at 
the 10% level. 
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Table 4: 
Impact of Changes in the Toughness of 
the Minimum Wage on Employment 
Range of Toughness Measure 
Lowest Median Highest 
Increase  in  (30.0) (55.5) (89.0) 
Tot. Emp.  0.0106 0.00346 -0.0059
Cov. Emp.  0.0127 0.00556 -0.0038
 
 
 
Table 5:  Impact of Minimum Wages on the Log of the Number 
of Hours Worked 
    
  Total 
Economy 
Covered 
Sector  
Self-
Employment 
    
Toughness 0.0055 0.0064
c  0.0223 
b 
 (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0091) 
 
(Toughness)
2  -0.00004 -0.000045
c  -0.00017 
b 
 (0.00003) (0.000025)
  (0.000066)  
Time Dummies  yes yes yes  
Industry Dummies  yes yes yes  
Constant 3.503
a  3.508
a  2.835 
a 
 (0.132) (0.130)
  (0.334)  
Adjusted R
2  0.80
  0.80
  0.79  
No. of Observations  91
  91
  91  
    
aSignificant at the 1% level; 
bsignificant at the 5% level; 
csignificant 
at the 10% level. 
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Table 6: 
Impact of Changes in the Toughness of the 
Minimum Wage on Hours Worked 
  Range of Toughness Measure
Increase in Hours Lowest  Median  Highest 
 of Work of  (30.0)  (55.5)  (89.0) 
Covered Sector  0.0037 0.00141 -0.0016
Self-employed 0.0121 0.00343 -0.0080
 
 
 
Table 7:  Impact of Minimum Wages on the Relative Level of  
Employment in the Covered Sector (Percent Covered) 
    
    
  (1)   (2)   (3)   
    
Toughness 0.019 *  0.0018
  0.0018 
 
 (0.012) (0.0035) (0.0037) 
 
(Toughness)
2  3.40e-07
  5.89e-06 
 
  (0.000025)
  (0.00003) 
 
Lag toughness 
  0.0029
b  
 
  (0.0012) 
 
Time Dummies  yes yes yes  
Industry Dummies  yes yes yes  
Constant 4.32
a  4.33
a  4.25
a  
 (0.06) (0.12)
  (0.12)  
Adjusted R
2  0.89 0.89 0.90  
    
*P=0.113    
aSignificant at the 1% level; 
bsignificant at the 5% level; 
csignificant at the 10% level. 
    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 479 
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Figure 1: Minimum Wage/Wage "Toughness" by Industry
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c) Theil Coefficient
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Self-Employed Covered Sector
Figure 3: Wage Inequality in Costa Rica Covered Sector vs. Self-Employed
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Figure 4: Gini for Covered Sector Workers, by Industrial Activity 
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